By Dipak Kurmi
The geopolitical landscape of South Asia is currently witnessing a complex and somewhat jarring recalibration as President Donald Trump attempts a delicate balancing act between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal Asim Munir. This strategic pivot was underscored on April 14, 2026, during a significant forty-minute telephonic conversation between Trump and Modi. US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor highlighted the warmth of this exchange, noting that Trump explicitly told Modi that the American administration holds deep affection and respect for him. However, simultaneously and perhaps paradoxically, Trump publicly signaled a resurgence of the US-Pakistan relationship by hinting at the imminent resumption of US-Iran negotiations. Trump indicated that these high-stakes talks would likely take place within Pakistan, specifically praising the role of Field Marshal Munir. By calling Munir fantastic and asserting that he is doing a great job, Trump has effectively placed the military leader on a pedestal far above Pakistan’s civilian Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif. This public endorsement marks a departure from traditional diplomatic protocols, signaling that Washington views the Rawalpindi GHQ, rather than the Islamabad secretariat, as the true seat of power and the primary interlocutor for regional stability.
The elevation of Munir as Trump’s favorite field marshal is not merely rhetorical but is reflected in the tangible diplomatic movements of April 2026. While Munir embarked on a high-profile visit to Tehran on April 15 to facilitate the US-Iran intermediation process, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar were notably relegated to a secondary diplomatic circuit involving Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. The optics suggest that the civilian leadership has been tasked with the administrative burden of briefing regional allies to assuage any anxieties regarding Pakistan’s newfound intermediary role, while the real negotiating game remains firmly in Munir’s hands. Reports suggest that Munir may soon be hosted in Washington, an event that would further cement his status as a pivotal figure in American eyes. Trump’s positivity toward Munir is consistent with his past behavior; Munir remains the only foreign military leader to have been hosted by the US President for formal talks and lunch at the White House. While this recognizes the ground reality of Pakistan’s domestic politics, it simultaneously delivers a brutal blow to the country’s fragile democratic structures by validating military dominance over elected institutions.
Historically, the Pakistan Army has been viewed by regional neighbors, particularly India, as a primary promoter of terrorism and cross-border instability since the early 1990s. It is therefore deeply ironic that the same institution, led by a chief who engineered his own rise to the position of Chief of Defence Forces, is now being embraced by the United States as a bridge to the Iranian clerical system. Even if Munir’s backchannel contacts with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps provide a unique leverage for Washington, the decision to publicly lionize the military chief at the expense of civilian governance raises significant ethical and strategic concerns. Such a move risks emboldening the army to corner even more of Pakistan’s dwindling national resources. The military already operates as an unaccountable and inefficient conglomerate that sponges off the state, stifling the very structural changes required for macroeconomic stability. By according Munir such high diplomatic status, the US may inadvertently be prolonging Pakistan’s economic misery by ensuring that the military remains the dominant and most well-funded actor in a bankrupt state.
This shift in American policy leads to a troubling question regarding the potential return of the India-Pakistan hyphenation. For years, Indian policy experts have argued that hyphenating India with Pakistan is a relic of history with no contemporary justification. India now possesses significant global weight, a burgeoning economy, and a seat at the table of major world powers, whereas Pakistan continues to struggle with chronic instability and a lack of appetite for reform. However, the current US administration appears to be exploring a new variant of this old paradigm. By involving Pakistan in West Asian security and using it as a conduit for Iranian diplomacy, the US may be preparing to accord Islamabad a larger security role in the Middle East and Afghanistan. This echoes the 1970s when Gulf states relied heavily on Pakistani defence personnel. While Saudi Arabia’s strategic mutual defence agreement has already seen Pakistani fighter aircraft deployed to the Abdul Aziz airbase in Dhahran, a broader US-led regional role for Pakistan could complicate India’s own strategic interests in the Gulf.
India’s interests in West Asia are vast and multifaceted, necessitating a more aggressive and skillful enhancement of its security and diplomatic postures. While the relationship with the United Arab Emirates has flourished, critics point out that External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s focus has been perhaps too narrow. As the imponderables of the post-Iran war era emerge, India must deepen its ties across all Gulf nations to protect its economic and energy interests. Relying on US-led frameworks may not be sufficient, especially if Washington intends to use Pakistan as its primary security proxy in the region. Furthermore, the US’s push for India to play a leading role in the Quad—comprising India, the US, Japan, and Australia—must be viewed through the lens of Washington’s broader China strategy. There are increasing signs that Trump may eventually seek a rapprochement with Beijing, which would leave the Quad hostage to the whims of US-China relations. Given India’s persistent border challenges and strategic competition with China, relying solely on American-led multilateral structures could prove to be a precarious gamble for New Delhi.
The underlying tension in the India-US partnership was perhaps best captured by the candid remarks of Christopher Landau in March 2026. His plain speaking served as a stark reminder that while the two nations share many common goals, the United States is wary of creating another peer competitor. Landau’s assertion that the US will not make the same mistake with India as it did with China—referring to the massive transfer of manufacturing and technology that fueled China’s rise—suggests that there are clear boundaries to American cooperation. This realization should prompt Indian policymakers to maintain a healthy degree of strategic autonomy. While the Modi-Munir balancing act performed by Trump highlights the transactional nature of American foreign policy, it also underscores the need for India to develop its own independent regional architecture. The goodwill generated for Pakistan through its intermediary role may provide a temporary bump in its international profile, but it cannot fix the structural infirmities of its system. For India, the challenge lies in navigating this revived hyphenation while ensuring that its rise as a global power is not hindered by the shifting priorities of a mercurial Washington.
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)
