By PK Khup Hangzo
On August 21, Kim Jong Un staged a rare public act of mourning, honoring North Korean soldiers killed while fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine. Bowing before portraits of 101 fallen troops and embracing grieving families, he called them “noble figures who gave up their precious lives for great victory and glory.” His words – “my heart aches and is bitter” – revealed the human cost of North Korea’s distant war, and marked the regime’s second public acknowledgment of its role in the conflict, and first admission of battlefield losses. While these gestures may appear symbolic, they underscore a deeper reality: North Korea has now entrenched itself as a critical player in a war far from its borders – a war that has profound implications for East Asia.
Last November, North Korea deployed roughly 11,000 troops to Russia, three months after about 20,000 Ukrainian soldiers invaded Kursk Oblast in western Russia. This marked the first time since World War II that foreign troops occupied Russian territory. The North Korean contingent reinforced approximately 48,000 Russian soldiers defending the region. Earlier this year, an additional 3,000 troops were sent, bringing North Korea’s total contribution to around 14,000 soldiers. North Korean units have largely been used as assault troops, spearheading attacks while Russian forces consolidate gains – one of the most dangerous roles on the battlefield. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) estimates that roughly 4,700 North Korean troops have suffered casualties, including about 600 deaths. Despite these losses, North Korea has shown no inclination to withdraw. Ukrainian intelligence suggests an additional 25,000-30,000 soldiers could be deployed in the coming months, further deepening North Korea’s involvement.
Not Just Troops
Even before deploying troops, North Korea had already become a critical lifeline for Russia, particularly through its ammunition supplies. The country holds one of the world’s largest stockpiles of artillery shells and rockets, much of it of Soviet origin and fully compatible with Russian artillery and multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). According to a joint study by the London-based Open Source Centre and Reuters, between August 2023 and March 2025, North Korea shipped an estimated 4.2-5.8 million rounds of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells and rockets. South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) suggests the figure may exceed 12 million 152mm shells since the Russia-Ukraine war began in February 2022. Experts estimate that North Korean supplies now account for nearly 40% of Russia’s total ammunition consumption.
North Korea has also supplied heavy weaponry to Russia, including the M1989 Koksan self-propelled howitzer and the M1991 Juche MLRS. The M1989 is the country’s longest-range artillery piece, capable of firing 170mm shells weighing over 45kg to distances of at least 40km. The M1991 launches 240mm rockets weighing roughly 85kg to ranges of up to 60km. More than 200 of these systems are believed to have been delivered, significantly enhancing Russia’s artillery strength. North Korea also provided advanced missile systems, notably the KN-23 (Hwasong-11) and KN-24 (Hwasong-11NA) short-range ballistic missiles. The KN-23 can deliver a 500kg warhead to about 700km, while the KN-24, with a similar payload, reaches roughly 400km. At least 148 of these missiles are believed to have been supplied, offering Russia additional long-range precision-strike capability.
What did North Korea Gain?
North Korea’s support has proved highly lucrative. Between March and November 2024, Russia reportedly shipped over one million barrels of petroleum to the country – a lifeline for a country strangled by UN sanctions since 2016. Analysts at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) estimate that North Korea has earned nearly $20 billion from its involvement in the war: about $275 million from troop deployments, nearly $19 billion from arms sales, and roughly $620 million from technical assistance. KIDA estimates that these earnings could cover North Korea’s food deficit for up to 33 years. Alternatively, they could finance the production of roughly 700 long-range ballistic missiles, each costing about $28.5 million. If Kim Jong Un chose instead to divert the funds to the regime’s elite, the windfall could bankroll North Korea’s lavish luxury expenditures – estimated at 1.7 billion dollars annually – for more than a decade.
Beyond economic gains, the Russia-Ukraine war offers North Korea something even more valuable: rare exposure to high-intensity, technology-driven combat. Its forces – largely untested since the Korean War (1950-1953) – are gaining firsthand experience in battlefield tactics, logistics, and modern weapons operations. The conflict also doubles as a proving ground for North Korean arms. Short-range ballistic missiles, once derided for poor accuracy, have reportedly demonstrated notable improvements under combat conditions. For North Korea’s military leadership, the war provides a window into the demands of modern warfare, while creating leverage to press Russia for advanced systems in return – from air-defense platforms and combat aircraft to sensitive technologies that could accelerate its nuclear and missile programs. Some transfers are already reported, including at least one Pantsir short-range air-defense system, directly enhancing North Korea’s operational capabilities.
Strategic Implications for East Asia
The consequences of North Korea’s deepening role in the Russia-Ukraine war reach far beyond Europe. By sending troops and weapons, Pyongyang is not only aiding Russia – it is gaining invaluable battlefield experience. A battle-hardened North Korean army, armed with combat-tested weapons and possibly enhanced by Russian military technology, could soon translate these lessons into its own campaigns. Missile launches, aggressive drills along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), or calculated brinkmanship designed to extract concessions from Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington may only be the first steps. Such developments would dramatically raise the risk of miscalculation in a region already described in 2024 as “more dangerous than at any time since early June 1950,” when the Korean War erupted. North Korea’s gamble is not simply about supporting an ally; it is a deliberate strategy to sharpen its military edge, expand its leverage, and prepare for future conflicts on its own terms. In effect, North Korea may be using the Russia-Ukraine war as both a proving ground and a rehearsal for wars yet to come.
(The writer is a Shillong-based independent researcher specializing in regional conflicts and the strategic implications of environmental change)
