By Dipak Kurmi
In a move that marks an unprecedented departure from over six decades of careful diplomacy, India announced on Wednesday that it was suspending the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, following the brutal terrorist attack on tourists in Pahalgam, Kashmir, where 26 innocent lives were lost at the hands of Pakistani terrorists. This dramatic action, conveyed officially by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, signals a fundamental shift in India’s approach to bilateral engagements with Pakistan, and it is poised to have far-reaching consequences on the geopolitical and environmental stability of South Asia.
“The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 will be held in abeyance with immediate effect, until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism,” Misri declared in New Delhi. The decision came alongside a raft of diplomatic measures aimed at isolating Pakistan, including the closure of the Attari border post, mass cancellation of visas, and the expulsion of multiple Pakistani diplomatic personnel from Indian soil. Yet, among these, the suspension of the IWT stands out not only for its symbolic weight but also for its potential long-term strategic implications.
Signed on September 19, 1960, after nine arduous years of negotiations mediated by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty is often hailed as one of the world’s most successful cases of water-sharing diplomacy. It allocated the use of the Indus River system’s six rivers between the two nations: India received the rights to the three “Eastern Rivers” — the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi — while Pakistan was accorded control over the “Western Rivers” — the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. The Treaty is remarkably detailed, containing 12 Articles and 8 Annexures (labelled A to H), and has astonishingly survived four wars and decades of mutual hostility.
Thus, India’s decision to suspend the IWT is historically significant. It opens up new strategic avenues for New Delhi. As P K Saxena, former Indian Commissioner for Indus Waters, explained, India can immediately halt the sharing of water flow data with Pakistan, a crucial component for managing river flows and flood forecasting. Additionally, the suspension removes design and operational constraints previously binding on India, allowing it to develop storage capacities on the Western Rivers and use techniques like reservoir flushing — notably on the Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project — to extend dam life and optimize water management.
Saxena further elaborated that the suspension permits India to deny Pakistani officials access to inspect hydroelectric projects like Kishenganga and Ratle, which have long been subjects of contention between the two countries. India’s ability to create new storage projects on the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers — previously restricted under the Treaty — could, in time, significantly alter the flow of waters that sustain Pakistan’s agrarian economy.
However, it is critical to note that there will be no immediate impact on the quantum of water reaching Pakistan. India’s current infrastructure lacks the capacity to stop or divert these river flows abruptly. Constructing the necessary dams and storage facilities will require several years, implying that the full strategic effects of Wednesday’s suspension will be realized only over the long term.
The legal and diplomatic ramifications of India’s decision are complex. The IWT does not contain a formal exit clause; neither India nor Pakistan can unilaterally abrogate it. Its provisions are designed to be perpetual, requiring mutual consent for any amendment or annulment. Nonetheless, while India’s suspension of the Treaty is highly provocative, it operates in a grey area of international law.
The Treaty’s dispute resolution mechanism — outlined in Article IX and elaborated in Annexures F and G — provides for a three-stage escalation process: initial resolution by the Permanent Indus Commission, followed by engagement with a neutral expert, and, if necessary, adjudication by an international Court of Arbitration. But as noted by former Pakistani federal law minister Ahmer Bilal Soofi in a 2016 interview with Dawn, if India chooses to suspend or disregard the Treaty altogether, the dispute resolution mechanisms would be rendered moot. Soofi highlighted that without an explicit provision for enforcement, Pakistan would find itself without a peaceful legal avenue for seeking India’s compliance, particularly since India’s reservations under the statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) block Pakistan from pursuing a case there.
This raises profound questions about the future of water diplomacy in South Asia. Pakistan, whose agricultural sector depends heavily on the waters of the Western Rivers, has yet to issue an official response to India’s suspension. Yet it is certain that Islamabad will view this move as a severe provocation and a direct threat to its food and water security.
The roots of this current confrontation over the IWT go back several years. India’s development of hydroelectric projects on the Western Rivers — specifically the Kishenganga project on a tributary of the Jhelum and the Ratle project on the Chenab — has long been a source of friction. Pakistan has consistently objected to the design features of these projects, arguing that they violate the Treaty’s conditions, despite their classification as “run-of-the-river” projects, which theoretically do not impede natural river flow.
In response to Pakistan’s persistent objections and perceived obstructionism, India issued its first-ever notice seeking the modification of the Treaty in January 2023, citing Islamabad’s “intransigence.” A second notice followed in September 2024, wherein India went a step further by formally requesting a “review and modification” of the Treaty — language that experts interpreted as signalling an Indian intent to fundamentally renegotiate or even abandon the current agreement.
Both notices were issued under Article XII(3) of the Treaty, which allows for modification by mutual consent. Although the procedural road to Treaty revision is arduous and fraught with risks, the notices themselves indicated India’s growing impatience with Pakistan’s strategy of using international forums to delay Indian hydroelectric projects.
The dispute reached another important milestone earlier this year when the Neutral Expert appointed by the World Bank, Michel Lino, ruled that he was competent to adjudicate the design differences between the two countries. Pakistan had contended that the differences raised by India were outside the scope of Part I of Annexure F of the Treaty, while India argued the opposite. Lino’s acceptance of jurisdiction under the Treaty terms represented a limited but notable victory for India in the ongoing legal battles over water use rights.
Now, with the Treaty formally suspended, all these processes — disputes, arbitration efforts, technical negotiations — are effectively in limbo. India’s action not only asserts its strategic leverage over a vital natural resource but also escalates tensions between two nuclear-armed neighbours already locked in a bitter standoff over Kashmir.
The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, a pillar of India-Pakistan relations for 64 years, marks the beginning of a new, uncharted era. It reflects the growing readiness of New Delhi to leverage every instrument of statecraft — including water diplomacy — in its campaign to force a decisive change in Pakistan’s policy of supporting cross-border terrorism. As infrastructure projects gain momentum in India and diplomatic channels grow ever more acrimonious, the waters of the Indus may soon carry not only the life-sustaining flow for millions but also the heavy burden of a fractured peace.
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)
