By Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury
When US Ambassador to Bangladesh Brent Christensen publicly warned about the long-term risks of Chinese military and strategic entanglement, his remarks were less a routine diplomatic caution and more an early alarm. Bangladesh, once considered a cautiously balanced actor in South Asia, now appears to be edging toward a deeper embrace of Beijing – with Pakistan quietly acting as a facilitating partner. At the center of this accelerating shift stands Muhammad Yunus, whose administration in Dhaka seems determined to recalibrate Bangladesh’s geopolitical orientation, even at the cost of long-term sovereignty and regional stability.
Christensen’s concern is not theoretical. Under Yunus’s leadership, Dhaka has revived and expanded discussions on acquiring advanced Chinese military hardware, including fourth-generation fighter jets such as the J-10C. These negotiations are reportedly being conducted both directly with Beijing and indirectly through Sino-Pakistan joint ventures, notably involving Pakistan’s defense manufacturing ecosystem.
Bangladesh’s Armed Forces Division, led by Principal Staff Officer Lieutenant General S.M. Kamrul Hasan, has engaged in high-level defense talks with Chinese counterparts. Delegations have visited China to explore modernization options for the Bangladesh Air Force, including the replacement of aging aircraft fleets. Parallel discussions with Pakistan have focused on the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet – co-developed by China and Pakistan – which Islamabad is actively marketing to Dhaka as a cost-effective multirole platform.
Pakistan’s military has publicly confirmed these engagements. Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu held detailed discussions with his Bangladeshi counterpart, Hasan Mahmood Khan, on defense cooperation, including the potential sale of JF-17 jets and the fast-tracked delivery of Super Mushshak trainer aircraft. Islamabad has also offered a comprehensive training and long-term maintenance ecosystem, effectively locking Bangladesh into a multi-decade dependency cycle.
Pakistan has also assured Bangladesh of the “fast-tracked delivery of Super Mushshak trainer aircraft, along with a complete training and long-term support ecosystem.
Beyond defense, Yunus’s administration has opened the door wide for Chinese infrastructure penetration. Syeda Rizwana Hasan, a key advisor in the Yunus regime, recently announced that China is eager to begin work on the Teesta River Master Plan “as soon as possible”. The statement was made in the presence of Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen during his visit to Rangpur – a region strategically close to India’s sensitive Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck”.
The symbolism of that visit was unmistakable. Beijing’s growing footprint near one of South Asia’s most delicate geopolitical chokepoints raises legitimate concerns in New Delhi and Washington alike. Combined with the Chinese-built submarine base at Pekua, these developments point to a broader strategic ambition that extends far beyond development assistance.
During his US Senate confirmation hearing, Ambassador Christensen acknowledged these risks. Responding to Senator Pete Ricketts’s warning that Chinese fighter jet sales would bind Bangladesh to Beijing’s defense industry for decades, Christensen emphasized his intent to clearly articulate the dangers of such dependency while highlighting the benefits of closer military-to-military cooperation with the United States.
Meanwhile, Beijing harshly reacted to China-related remarks by the US Ambassador to Bangladesh on January 22, urging the US side “to be more aware of its responsibilities, and focus more on actions” that are “conducive to Bangladesh’s stability” as well as the development and cooperation in the region.
Spokesperson at the Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, referring to Ambassador Christensen’s comments stated, “Such remarks by the US Ambassador to Bangladesh are irresponsible and utterly unfounded”.
The spokesperson said they confuse right and wrong and are ‘completely out of ulterior motives’.
Beijing’s reaction was swift – and unusually harsh. On January 22, the Chinese Embassy in Dhaka publicly rebuked Christensen, calling his remarks “irresponsible”, “utterly unfounded,” and driven by “ulterior motives”. Such language, rare in diplomatic exchanges involving Bangladesh, suggests deep Chinese sensitivity about scrutiny of its expanding role.
This sharp response also exposes Beijing’s urgency. China is not merely offering arms or infrastructure; it is seeking strategic alignment. Pakistan’s involvement strengthens this architecture, creating a Sino-Pak axis that offers Dhaka military hardware, financing, training, and diplomatic cover—all while reducing Western leverage.
For Washington, the challenge is compounded by Muhammad Yunus’s political history. Known for his longstanding hostility toward Donald Trump and his close associations with the Clinton network and other Democratic Party power centers, Yunus is unlikely to respond positively to pressure from a US administration perceived as adversarial. This ideological distance further narrows America’s options.
As Bangladesh moves toward its February 12 referendum and general elections – processes critics argue are being engineered to consolidate Yunus’s authority – the window for recalibration is closing fast. What is at stake is not just Bangladesh’s defense procurement policy, but its strategic autonomy.
If current trends continue, Dhaka may soon find itself firmly embedded within a Sino-Pak security ecosystem – one that serves Beijing’s regional ambitions far more than Bangladesh’s national interest. For the Indo-Pacific, this would mark yet another quiet but consequential shift in the balance of power.
(The writer is an award-winning journalist, writer, and Editor of the newspaper Blitz. He specializes in counterterrorism and regional geopolitics.)
