In the realm of geopolitics, individuals in diplomatic and governmental roles often embody the proverbial three wise monkeys, distinct from the frontline soldiers. Over a year ago, I encountered someone outside this conventional echelon who disclosed details about Chinese intrusions across the LAC in 2020 and Operation Snow Leopard – the Indian Army’s sole response to these incursions. Insights from former COAS General Naravane’s book, “Four Stars of Destiny,” and the vigilant observations of Chushul Councillor Konchok Stanzin shed new light on the complex ground reality.
However, a shroud of secrecy envelops Manipur and the LAC, with Parliament and the Standing Committees on Defence barred from any debate or discussion. Cryptic statements from Home, Defence, and Foreign Ministers add to the ambiguity, intertwining questions about the LAC with the unwavering integrity of ‘our brave jawans.’
This conundrum mirrors past instances, such as Uri’s surgical strikes and Operation Balakot, pivotal in the 2019 elections. Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Ajay Bisaria, echoed this ambiguity, stating in his recent book, “Anger Management: The Troubled Diplomatic Relationship between India and Pakistan,” that while there exists a narrative, concrete proof of the effectiveness of the Balakot strike is elusive.
The government found itself caught off guard by the unexpected moves of the Chinese. Being the initiators, the Chinese held a strategic advantage. The intricate challenge stemmed from a divergence in the perception of the LAC, creating a host of unresolved issues that the Chinese were reluctant to address. This differing viewpoint ultimately prompted the Chinese to assert their 1959 Claim line.
Emphasising that China’s actions should be labeled as ‘transgression’ rather than intrusion, the individual stressed that these actions did not result in the loss of Indian territory. Regrettably, the lingering points of contention at Depsang and Demchok seem unlikely to find resolution. I posited that perhaps Indian actions at Doklam and Home Minister Amit Shah’s parliamentary commitment to reclaiming Aksai Chin contributed to this complex state of affairs.
He addressed the challenges in patrolling arising from the presence of buffer zones and proposed a potential resolution by implementing regulations for patrols on both sides. Innovative approaches, he suggested, could involve scheduled patrolling on specific days and the identification of designated no-patrolling zones to mitigate clashes. Regarding demilitarised zones (DMZs), he touched upon the relocation specifics in the Fingers area but omitted any mention of Kailash Heights being designated as a buffer zone.
Notably, on December 29, Congress leader Jairam Ramesh highlighted Stanzin’s report that a memorial on Kailash Heights, commemorating the Rezang La battle post the 1962 war, was demolished. This demolition was attributed to its location within the DMZ, where, as per the withdrawal agreement, all man-made landforms had to be removed.
India insisted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) erase all markings in Mandarin and English indicating the Fingers area as Chinese territory. The consequence of India relinquishing Kailash Heights and allowing it to become a DMZ was a strategic miscalculation, evolving into a perpetual blunder, as India forfeited the ability to reclaim its own territory.
The most intriguing revelation from our discussion was that, according to my friend, the decision to vacate Kailash Heights was made by the Army, contrary to the government’s preference for it to be held, given the advantageous position it offered to our forces, as events later demonstrated. While General Naravane’s book, “Four Stars of Destiny,” provides a detailed account of Operation Snow Leopard, it remains silent on the reasons behind abandoning Kailash Heights. The released excerpts, subject to a publication embargo until clearance, create a significant void in the narrative.
Within the pages of Operation Snow Leopard, a theme of indecision within the government’s leadership emerges, particularly in handling a critical situation arising from the massing of tanks, with a paramount directive not to initiate hostilities. General Naravane attributes these orders to the highest echelons of authority. Though this may seem relegated to the annals of history, just as the present government criticises Nehru for the loss of Aksai Chin, a future non-BJP administration may reproach it for allowing China to realise its 1959 Claim Line in Ladakh and for relinquishing the gains achieved during Operation Snow Leopard.
In 2022, a government official dismissed the possibility of any breakthrough, be it military or diplomatic, on the LAC, asserting that India had already attained what China was willing to concede. High-level meetings were ruled out, despite Prime Minister Modi’s attempt at the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia. The official anticipated a continued status quo until after the 2024 elections, suggesting that the government would maintain a tight grip on the LAC until securing a third term. Remarkably, 90 per cent of his predictions have materialised, leaving the remaining uncertainties to unfold in due time. Regrettably, the potential revelations in Naravane’s book on the LAC may be obscured, as its release, if permitted at all, is likely to undergo substantial censorship.
Ajay Bisaria’s book faced no hindrances despite containing crucial details on operational matters. The book underscores that both the Balakot air strikes, the effectiveness of which Bisaria does not explicitly confirm, and the preparedness of nine missiles poised for launch to secure the release of Wing Commander Abhinandan were manifestations of the government’s assertiveness.
In a remarkable display of muscularity, Prime Minister Modi proudly proclaimed in an election rally his intent to target Pakistan with nine missiles, clarifying that these were not intended for Diwali celebrations. This election rhetoric breached several red lines, yet all transgressions seem to be forgiven and forgotten when it comes to disclosing classified information that showcases the government’s strength and power. Interestingly, Naravane’s forthcoming book appears to face a different fate, with indications suggesting potential challenges in sharing such classified insights.
(The writer can be reached at dipaknewslive@gmail.com)
