The political upheaval that led to the ouster of Sheikh Hasina Wazed’s Awami League government in Bangladesh on August 5 this year has sparked a significant transformation, but the nature of this change remains a matter of intense debate. The first few months following the government’s fall left many observers in India and the West uncertain about the direction the country would take. At first glance, it appeared to be a familiar, military-driven change of government, one that would result in superficial shifts within the upper echelons of power without altering the fundamental political landscape. This interpretation was particularly popular among sections of Dhaka’s elite, who sought to downplay the significance of the upheaval and framed it as a reaction to the excesses of the Wazed administration. They suggested that the new government would prioritise stabilising the country and restoring the status quo, but with more authoritarian undertones.
However, this initial reading of events overlooked deeper currents in Bangladesh’s political history. The alternative, more widely accepted by retired diplomats and political analysts, is that what unfolded was a genuine regime change—a dramatic shift in the ideological direction of the country. This argument is rooted in the complex and often tumultuous political trajectory of Bangladesh since its independence in 1971.
For much of the country’s history, two ideological strands have dominated: one centred on the legacy of the Liberation War and its secular ideals, championed by the Awami League and its founding leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; the other, a counter-revolutionary narrative, which emerged after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 and the rise of military dictatorships. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), formed by Ziaur Rahman, became the main proponent of this counter-revolutionary ideology, aligning itself with Islamist parties, some of which had opposed Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan.
The fall of the Awami League government in August 2024 cannot be fully understood without considering the historical context of these ideological divisions. Throughout her tenure, Sheikh Hasina Wazed maintained a fierce commitment to secularism and the legacy of the 1971 Liberation War. Her government’s prosecution of war criminals, particularly leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and its focus on eradicating the influence of Islamists in politics, reinforced the secular vision of Bangladesh. The Awami League’s approach was also marked by a determination to uphold the memory of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the father of the nation, a legacy that sharply contradicted the narrative pushed by Islamist factions.
However, in the wake of the August 2024 upheaval, the dominant political forces in Bangladesh seem to be shifting away from this secular, Liberation War-inspired vision. The new government, backed by the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, has unleashed a brutal political cleansing targeting the Awami League and its supporters. Criminal cases have been filed against nearly 194,000 members of the Awami League, and the properties of its leaders have been destroyed. The most symbolic target of this political purge has been the monuments to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which have been defaced or demolished, signaling a direct challenge to the secular nationalism that once defined the nation.
While the student movement has been at the forefront of this political upheaval, it is clear that the regime change has the full support of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, which have long been associated with the counter-revolutionary forces in Bangladesh. The questions surrounding which political faction — whether the Razakar lobby or the softer Islamists within the BNP—has gained the upper hand remain unresolved. However, it is evident that the forces aligned with the legacy of the 1971 Liberation War have been decisively defeated. The counter-revolution has triumphed, and with it, the revival of a vision of Bangladesh as an Islamic Republic.
This revival of Islamic nationalism has also had serious implications for Bangladesh’s minority communities, particularly Hindus. Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, there has been a systematic attempt to marginalise and push out the Hindu population from East Pakistan, and later Bangladesh, as part of an ongoing effort to solidify the country’s Islamic identity. The 1971 war, which saw a massive exodus of Hindus to India, only exacerbated the situation. Though the formation of Bangladesh brought some relief to the Hindu community, the 1990s saw another wave of migration to India due to continued persecution. Today, Hindus make up just 7.95 per cent of the population, a dramatic decline from their share at the time of independence.
Under the new government, attacks on Hindu religious institutions have become more frequent, and the persecution of Hindus is being framed as a response to the perceived over-assertion of the Hindu community in the 15 years of Awami League rule. The assault on Hindu religious sites, including the ISKCON temples, is seen as a proxy attack on India, which supporters of the regime accuse of exploiting Bangladesh’s resources. This targeting of Hindus has led to protests from Hindu organisations across the globe, with many voicing their condemnation of the new regime’s actions. Despite the Modi government’s strong response to these attacks, India’s policy toward Bangladesh remains cautious. The closure of the border and the halt on visa issuance have effectively stopped the flow of Hindu refugees into India, leaving them trapped in Bangladesh’s increasingly hostile political environment.
For India, the situation in Bangladesh presents a strategic conundrum. The growing influence of radical Islamism in its eastern neighbor poses a direct threat to the security and stability of India’s own Muslim-majority states, particularly West Bengal. A radicalised Bangladesh could embolden extremist elements within India, exacerbating existing communal tensions. The rise of radical Islamism in Bangladesh could also complicate India’s long-standing efforts to maintain a peaceful and cooperative relationship with its neighbour. The reality of a hostile regime on India’s eastern border is one that New Delhi cannot afford to ignore. The longer the situation persists, the more it will tilt the strategic balance in favor of Bangladesh’s Islamist factions, further complicating India’s security outlook.
India’s response to this crisis will need to be measured but firm. While economic sanctions or an economic blockade may not be politically viable, New Delhi must explore other avenues to counter the growing influence of radical Islam in Bangladesh. This could involve diplomatic pressure, closer cooperation with international organisations, and support for Bangladesh’s secular forces, including the Hindu minority community. However, the geopolitical realities of the situation suggest that India will need to be more proactive in addressing the ideological shift in Bangladesh and its implications for regional security.
The regime change in Bangladesh marks a pivotal moment in the country’s history. The rise of radical Islamism and the revival of an Islamic Republic in Bangladesh represent a dramatic departure from the secular ideals that shaped the nation’s independence and identity. This shift has profound implications not only for Bangladesh but also for its neighbours, particularly India. The growing influence of Islamists in Bangladesh presents a significant challenge to regional stability, and India must tread carefully as it navigates this increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. The situation in Bangladesh will undoubtedly remain a key area of focus for India’s foreign policy in the years to come.
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)
