By Dipak Kurmi
After nearly a year under President’s Rule, Manipur stands on the cusp of what is officially described as the return of a “popular government,” with Yumnam Khemchand Singh of the Bharatiya Janata Party set to assume office as Chief Minister. At the level of the Union government, the transition is being presented as a constitutional necessity. The arithmetic in the Assembly aligns, the extended tenure of central rule has run its course, and the formal logic of parliamentary democracy demands movement toward an elected executive. From a distance, the shift appears orderly, even reassuring, suggesting that institutional normalcy is being restored after a prolonged and painful interruption.
Yet in the Kuki and Zomi-dominated areas of the state, the word “popular” carries an unmistakable ambiguity. For communities that have endured months of displacement, fractured roads, burned homes, and relief camps that have quietly evolved into semi-permanent settlements, the announcement does not automatically translate into confidence. The pressing question is not merely whether an elected government is returning, but whether politics itself can once again function as a guarantor of safety and dignity. Student organisations in Churachandpur have taken to the streets, protesting the formation of a government without an accompanying political settlement. Even when Kuki and Zomi groups indicated willingness to engage with a future administration, they did so with conditions, seeking written assurances, a clear timeline, and concrete movement toward a political arrangement within the life of the Assembly.
The nearly year-long delay in restoring an elected government revealed a more complex reality than constitutional constraint alone. Reports suggested that the impasse stemmed largely from internal disagreements within the ruling party, as BJP legislators struggled for months to converge on a leadership choice. The paralysis was less about an absence of numbers than about an absence of consensus. Once the internal question of succession was settled, the path to reinstating a popular government cleared with notable speed. This sequence exposed the fragility of earlier justifications that cited law and order or constitutional caution as primary obstacles. It underscored how leadership disputes within a party can ripple outward, shaping the tempo of governance in a conflict-affected state.
From the Centre’s vantage point, the reasoning behind the transition is not difficult to trace. President’s Rule centralised administrative authority and consolidated security decisions at a moment of intense instability. Over time, however, the pressure to normalise governance began to outweigh the caution associated with unresolved political questions. The urgency to demonstrate institutional continuity gradually eclipsed the patience required for deeper reconciliation. Yet the speed of the present move does not erase the structural fault lines that remain unaddressed. The conflict that erupted on May 3, 2023, was not triggered by the absence of formal institutions. It was the culmination of a prolonged erosion of trust, marked by perceptions that decisions about land, identity, and belonging were being shaped without equitable consultation across communities.
Long before the first houses were torched and the first families displaced, politics in Manipur had taken on a coercive edge. Administrative authority appeared increasingly concentrated, while the hill districts felt that their concerns were being sidelined in decisions with far-reaching implications. By the time violence broke out between Meitei and Kuki-Zo groups, the social contract had already frayed. The subsequent months of bloodshed, displacement, and destruction deepened these fissures. Roads were blocked, communities segregated, and thousands forced into camps. Free movement became contingent on informal negotiations and security clearances. In such an environment, restoring a government cannot automatically restore legitimacy.
The government that Khemchand Singh is poised to lead inherits a state that remains physically and psychologically segmented. It will preside over a society where safety and justice are often perceived as distinct from authority. For many displaced families, rehabilitation and political assurances are not secondary issues to be addressed once governance resumes; they are preconditions for believing that governance has meaning. The insistence on written guarantees and defined timelines reflects a profound scepticism born of experience. Communities that have witnessed the collapse of order are reluctant to rely solely on verbal commitments or symbolic gestures. They seek assurances that can be referenced, evaluated, and enforced.
By restoring a government before a comprehensive political settlement is reached, the Centre effectively transfers the burden of reconciliation to a state leadership that may possess limited autonomy in critical areas. Negotiations with armed groups, questions of administrative reconfiguration, and decisions concerning territorial security often remain under the purview of national authorities. The new administration may be tasked with managing everyday governance, yet the boundaries within which it operates are not entirely of its own design. This structural limitation raises questions about how much latitude the state government will have to respond to the conditional demands articulated by Kuki and Zomi groups.
Supporters of the transition argue, not without reason, that democratic life cannot remain indefinitely suspended. An extended period of President’s Rule risks eroding the very principle of representative governance. Elected representatives, they contend, must shoulder responsibility and re-anchor accountability within the state. However, recent history in Manipur demonstrates that the mere presence of elected officials does not automatically translate into responsive leadership. People are not demanding immediate solutions to deeply entrenched disputes. Rather, they seek clarity, direction, and a credible articulation of political intent that endures beyond ceremonial announcements.
The broader implications of Manipur’s trajectory extend beyond its borders. The state occupies a critical position within India’s Act East policy and serves as a gateway to Southeast Asia. Prolonged instability undermines connectivity projects, dampens investor confidence, and complicates regional security calculations. For the Union government, stabilising Manipur is intertwined with national strategic interests. Yet stability that rests solely on administrative control, without parallel efforts at reconciliation, risks remaining brittle. Sustainable peace requires not only security deployments and institutional restoration but also a deliberate rebuilding of trust among communities.
The coming months will test whether the restoration of a popular government marks the beginning of substantive political repair or merely a procedural reset. It may take years, perhaps even a decade, for Manipur to heal from the trauma of displacement and violence. Most residents recognise the scale of that task. What they seek in the present moment is evidence that democracy has internalised the lessons of recent failures. Authority must demonstrate that it understands how legitimacy can erode and how costly that erosion has been for ordinary citizens.
As Yumnam Khemchand Singh prepares to assume office, his leadership will be evaluated not only on administrative efficiency but on the capacity to bridge a state divided by fear and suspicion. The challenge is formidable. It requires navigating the expectations of the Centre while cultivating local legitimacy, ensuring security without suppressing dialogue, and translating symbolic inclusivity into tangible policy outcomes. Manipur does not require reassurance that democratic procedures have resumed. It requires proof that governance can once again serve as a shield rather than a distant abstraction. In that demanding task lies the true measure of whether this transition signifies renewal or merely the appearance of order restored.
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)
