By Dipak Kurmi
On September 19, 1960, in the port city of Karachi, a landmark accord was signed between Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s President Mohammad Ayub Khan—the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Heralded as a triumph of diplomacy over discord, this treaty aimed to resolve one of the most complex bilateral disputes stemming from the 1947 Partition: the sharing of river waters between India and Pakistan. The IWT was only the second significant agreement between the two neighbours since Pakistan’s inception, the first being the Nehru-Noon Pact of 1958 concerning East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.
Yet, the IWT was more than just a water-sharing agreement; it was an emblem of political courage and calculated compromise in a time when emotions, suspicion, and the wounds of Partition still ran deep. It remarkably withstood the test of time—surviving four wars, decades of cross-border terrorism, and relentless domestic opposition in India—until it was finally suspended by New Delhi on April 23, 2025, just a day after terrorists massacred 26 Indian civilians in the lush meadows of Pahalgam. The decision to abrogate the treaty was widely seen as a symbolic as well as strategic retaliation, marking the end of an uneasy hydrological truce.
A Dispute Rooted in Partition
The origins of the water dispute can be traced back to the very fabric of Partition. The division of the Indus river system—a lifeline for agrarian economies in both countries—was fraught with ambiguity. One illustrative example is the allocation of the Depalpur canal to Pakistan while the control of the headworks feeding it, the Ferozepur Headworks, remained with India. This imbalance spurred immediate diplomatic tensions. To manage the urgent crisis over water supply from East Punjab to Pakistan’s West Punjab, Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Pakistan’s then Finance Minister Malik Ghulam Mohammad signed the Inter-Dominion Accord on May 4, 1948.
Under this temporary pact, India agreed to allow water to flow into Pakistan for its longstanding usage, with the understanding that the flow would gradually be reduced to facilitate Pakistan’s transition to alternative sources. However, even this arrangement was marred by mistrust. Pakistan secretly initiated construction of a channel upstream of Ferozepur to divert the Sutlej waters—an act of duplicity that, had it succeeded, would have left India’s canals dry. In retaliation, India constructed the Harike Barrage in Ferozepur to safeguard water supply to its eastern and Bikaner canals. Pakistan responded in kind by building the Bambanwala-Ravi-Bedian-Dipalpur (BRBD) canal, escalating hydrological brinkmanship.
Enter the World Bank
As tensions simmered, Pakistan proposed taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice—moves firmly rejected by India. In 1951, in a significant diplomatic shift, the World Bank stepped in as a neutral mediator. By 1954, the Bank proposed a division of the six rivers of the Indus basin: the three western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—were allocated to Pakistan, while the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—were allotted to India, barring minor uses in Jammu and Kashmir.
India accepted the proposal; Pakistan hesitated. To bridge this impasse, a transitional agreement was signed in Washington D.C. on October 31, 1955, between N.D. Gulhati of India and G. Mueenuddin from Pakistan. Yet, the issue of funding the replacement works for Pakistan’s new water infrastructure remained unresolved. The financial burden—pegged at nearly Rs 700 crore—posed a formidable challenge. Eventually, international donors, including the U.S., UK, Australia, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, and the World Bank, pledged Rs 620 crore, with India contributing Rs 83 crore in ten instalments. This collective pool was managed as the Indus Basin Development Fund.
It was assumed that the replacement works in Pakistan would be completed within a decade from 1960, with a possible three-year extension at a penalty of Rs 4 crore per year. After six years of negotiations, Pakistan finally acquiesced to the terms, setting the stage for the treaty’s signing in 1960. The IWT came into retrospective effect from April that year.
Domestic Opposition and Political Risk
Upon returning from Karachi, Nehru defended the treaty in the Indian Parliament. On November 30, 1960, during a heated Lok Sabha debate, he justified India’s financial contribution to Pakistan’s infrastructure development, stating, “We are not talking in terms of agreements, but in terms of disagreements… what one gains is infinitely more than a sum that we may give now or later.” He also supported the World Bank’s mediation role, asserting that external expertise could add legitimacy and technical rigour to the process.
However, Nehru’s optimism failed to convince many. Parliamentarians like Madhu Limaye, J.B. Kripalani, Balraj Madhok, and a young Atal Bihari Vajpayee—then a first-time MP from Balrampur—vocally opposed the treaty. Vajpayee, presciently, warned that “despite this treaty, no one knows that Pakistan will behave like our friend.” Critics derided the agreement as a “treaty of surrender,” expressing fears that Pakistan would weaponise the rivers in future conflicts.
Their concerns were not unfounded. Within five years of the treaty’s signing, India and Pakistan went to war in 1965, largely over Kashmir. The war renewed calls for the abrogation of the treaty. On November 10, 1965, Irrigation Minister K.L. Rao responded in Parliament, underscoring the treaty’s quasi-tripartite nature involving the World Bank and foreign donors, which complicated any unilateral withdrawal.
The Legacy of the Treaty
Under the IWT’s framework, Pakistan constructed several key projects, most notably the Mangla Dam, completed in 1967. In a gesture of statesmanship, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent a congratulatory message to Ayub Khan while en route to Moscow, marking a rare moment of bilateral goodwill. But even this diplomatic nicety couldn’t shield her from domestic backlash. Like her father before her, Indira had to face a chorus of criticism in Parliament, with opposition leaders maintaining that the treaty compromised India’s sovereign interests.
Yet, despite all political turbulence, the IWT became a rare beacon of continuity in a volatile relationship. It endured the 1971 Bangladesh War, the Kargil conflict, and the post-9/11 period of escalated militancy. It was often hailed as a model of resilient diplomacy—until the Pahalgam massacre on April 22, 2025.
The End of a Diplomatic Era
The brutal killing of 26 Indian civilians by Pakistan-backed terrorists acted as a tipping point. The following day, the Indian government officially placed the IWT in abeyance. The move was a watershed moment, signifying India’s strategic shift from conciliation to coercion. It sent a clear message: cross-border terrorism would no longer coexist with the goodwill of international agreements.
India’s decision to suspend the IWT was not just a diplomatic retaliation; it was a calculated manoeuvre to apply pressure on Pakistan’s economy and agriculture, both heavily dependent on Indus waters. While the full ramifications of the abrogation are still unfolding, it has undeniably altered the contours of South Asian geopolitics.
The Indus Waters Treaty, born out of Partition-era hostility and nurtured by Cold War-era diplomacy, represented both the fragility and resilience of Indo-Pak relations. For 64 years, it stood as a symbol of what diplomacy could achieve even amidst deep animosity. But like all treaties, it was bound by the conduct of its signatories. When that conduct degenerated into repeated acts of violence, the very foundation of the treaty crumbled. The waters of the Indus—once divided to forge peace—now reflect the enduring discord between two nations that remain, to this day, neighbours more in geography than in spirit.
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)
