By Dipak Kurmi
After surviving four wars, countless terrorist attacks, and six decades of turbulent India-Pakistan relations, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) finds itself at a critical juncture. India’s decision to suspend the agreement following the Pahalgam terrorist attack in April 2024 marks a watershed moment in South Asian geopolitics, transforming water diplomacy from a stabilizing force into a potential weapon of strategic leverage.
The suspension of this landmark treaty represents more than a mere diplomatic maneuver; it signals India’s willingness to exercise the inherent advantages of its position as an upper riparian state after exhausting conventional diplomatic channels to address Pakistan’s support for cross-border terrorism. This development threatens to reshape the entire framework of India-Pakistan relations, elevating water security to the same level of contention as terrorism and the Kashmir dispute.
Historical Foundations and Competing Narratives
The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank in 1960, emerged from the complex aftermath of Partition, when the division of the subcontinent left Pakistan heavily dependent on rivers flowing through Indian territory. The agreement allocated approximately 80 percent of the water from the six rivers of the Indus system to Pakistan, a distribution that has become a source of persistent debate and misunderstanding.
Uttam Kumar Sinha’s comprehensive analysis in “Trial by Water” (2025) illuminates the nuanced motivations that drove both nations toward this agreement. For India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the treaty represented an olive branch extended in the spirit of regional peace and stability. Nehru viewed water disputes as distractions from India’s larger developmental aspirations and demonstrated remarkable magnanimity in his approach to negotiations. His famous declaration that “We purchased a settlement, if you like; we purchased peace” reflects his belief that generous water-sharing arrangements could anchor regional stability.
However, contemporary Indian leadership has reframed this narrative. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s recent parliamentary statement that Nehru had “purchased not peace, but appeasement” captures the evolving Indian perspective on the treaty’s original premises. This rhetorical shift reflects growing frustration with Pakistan’s inability to reciprocate India’s water-sharing generosity with corresponding restraint in supporting terrorist activities.
Pakistan’s approach to the treaty was fundamentally different, driven by acute awareness of its vulnerable position as a lower riparian state. Pakistani leadership understood the strategic implications of depending on an adversarial neighbor for water security, viewing the treaty not as a generous gesture but as essential protection against potential water weaponization. This security-minded perspective explains Pakistan’s consistent reluctance to celebrate the seemingly favorable 80:20 distribution, recognizing that any public acknowledgment of victory would undermine its carefully cultivated narrative of victimhood.
The Geography of Power
The treaty’s water allocation was not based on volumetric assessments or population ratios but on geographical realities, terrain considerations, and the natural flow patterns of the rivers. India received complete control over the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) while gaining limited rights to the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab), which flow primarily to Pakistan.
This arrangement initially appeared to benefit both parties, with India securing more water rights than originally requested while Pakistan gained assured access to the larger western rivers. However, the treaty’s implementation revealed deeper strategic complexities that neither side had fully anticipated.
India’s restrained use of its rights on the western rivers over the decades demonstrates that the country was not starved of water resources under the treaty framework. Yet this restraint became a source of frustration as Pakistan systematically employed the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms to delay or obstruct legitimate Indian water projects in Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan’s strategic use of Article IX, the treaty’s dispute redressal mechanism, transformed what was intended as a technical consultation process into a tool for broader geopolitical rivalry. This pattern of obstruction revealed Pakistan’s true concern: not inadequate water allocation, but the potential for India to disrupt water flows upon which Pakistani agriculture and economy depend.
The Kashmir Connection
The inextricable link between water security and the Kashmir dispute represents one of the most complex aspects of India-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s desire for control over Kashmir stems not merely from territorial ambitions or religious motivations but from profound anxiety about water security. The headwaters of crucial rivers flow through Kashmir before entering Pakistan, making control of the region essential to Pakistan’s long-term water strategy.
This connection became apparent shortly after the treaty’s signing when Pakistan’s military ruler General Ayub Khan spoke of seeking physical possession of Kashmir. The statement revealed the strategic calculus underlying Pakistan’s Kashmir policy: securing the upper reaches of the river system to eliminate dependence on Indian goodwill for water security.
For Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute thus represents an existential challenge that transcends territorial or ideological considerations. Control over the region would provide the strategic depth necessary to address its fundamental vulnerability as a lower riparian state, explaining the persistence of Pakistani support for militancy in the region despite repeated diplomatic failures.
A Model of Resilience
The Indus Waters Treaty’s survival through four wars, countless terrorist attacks, and numerous periods of extreme tension between India and Pakistan has often been cited as a model for transboundary water governance. This resilience deserves recognition, but it also requires proper attribution.
The treaty’s success rests primarily on India’s consistent adherence to its obligations as an upper riparian state. India has maintained minimum flows, shared data and information with Pakistan, and refrained from using its strategic advantage for political leverage. This restraint stands in stark contrast to how water resources have been weaponized in other global conflicts, demonstrating remarkable institutional discipline despite severe provocations.
The asymmetrical nature of the treaty’s implementation explains its durability. Upper riparian actions have immediate downstream consequences, creating strong incentives for responsible behavior. Conversely, lower riparian actions have no upstream impact, allowing Pakistan to engage in obstructionist tactics without facing immediate consequences for its own water security.
This dynamic raises important questions about reciprocity and fairness in transboundary water management. Would the treaty have survived if Pakistan had been the upper riparian state? Given Pakistan’s documented use of treaty provisions for political obstruction, the answer seems doubtful.
Strategic Calculations and Future Scenarios
India’s decision to suspend the treaty reflects a fundamental shift in strategic thinking. After decades of restraint and good faith adherence to treaty obligations, India has finally decided to exercise the inherent advantages of its geographical position. This move represents the culmination of frustration with Pakistan’s continued support for terrorism despite India’s water-sharing generosity.
Pakistan’s response reveals its acute awareness that it already enjoys the best possible arrangement under current circumstances. Pakistani reluctance to engage in genuine renegotiation reflects the realistic assessment that any new agreement would likely be less favorable than the existing treaty.
India’s insistence on bilateral renegotiation without third-party mediation presents Pakistan with an uncomfortable choice. The World Bank’s role in brokering the original treaty provided Pakistan with important leverage and protection. Bilateral negotiations would eliminate this buffer, forcing Pakistan to confront India’s superior bargaining position directly.
Pakistani experts’ suggestions about involving China and Afghanistan in future negotiations reflect desperation rather than realistic strategic planning. While these countries control small portions of the Indus basin (8 percent for China and 6 percent for Afghanistan), their inclusion would complicate negotiations without fundamentally altering Pakistan’s disadvantageous position.
The New Strategic Reality
India’s current approach appears designed to maximize strategic pressure while avoiding complete water disruption. By suspending formal treaty mechanisms while continuing to share flow and weather data, India maintains plausible deniability regarding humanitarian concerns while introducing strategic uncertainty into Pakistani calculations.
This calibrated approach recognizes that complete water cutoff would be both impractical and counterproductive. Instead, India seeks to leverage uncertainty about future flows to compel Pakistani reconsideration of its terrorism policies. Even minor disruptions in water timing and volume could have significant logistical implications for Pakistani agriculture and industry.
The suspension also frees India to pursue water projects in Jammu and Kashmir without Pakistani obstruction. This represents a practical victory that may prove more valuable than formal treaty renegotiation. India can now complete long-delayed infrastructure projects while Pakistan loses its primary mechanism for strategic obstruction.
Implications for Regional Stability
The transformation of water diplomacy from a stabilizing force into a source of strategic leverage carries profound implications for South Asian security. Water disputes may now join terrorism and Kashmir as central pillars of India-Pakistan rivalry, complicating future diplomatic engagement and conflict resolution efforts.
This development also signals broader changes in Indian strategic thinking. The willingness to suspend a successful treaty demonstrates growing confidence in India’s ability to manage regional relationships without excessive accommodation of Pakistani sensitivities. This assertiveness may extend to other areas of bilateral engagement, potentially reshaping the entire framework of South Asian geopolitics.
The Indus Waters Treaty’s six-decade journey from a symbol of cooperation to a tool of strategic leverage reflects the complex evolution of India-Pakistan relations. As both nations navigate this new reality, the management of transboundary water resources will increasingly depend on broader political settlements rather than technical arrangements. The age of Indian restraint in water diplomacy appears to have ended, ushering in a new era where geography becomes destiny in South Asian strategic calculations.
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)
