By Dipak Kurmi
The trajectory of India’s foreign policy has always been shaped by turbulence. The present moment is no exception. India today finds itself confronted with a complex triad: an abrasive phase in India–United States relations under President Donald Trump, the enduring pull of its long-standing partnership with Russia, and the uncertain but potentially transformative scope of recalibrating its ties with China. Each path before New Delhi presents both promise and peril, and what India chooses—or chooses not to choose—over the coming years will echo across its economy, security and diplomatic standing for decades.
What complicates matters is that India is not new to such storms. In the aftermath of Pokhran-II in 1998, India faced severe American sanctions. Yet less than a decade later, it had emerged as Washington’s strategic partner through the civil nuclear agreement brokered by George W. Bush Jr. Cycles of friction followed by recovery have defined the India–US relationship. It is this history of resilience that tempers the current crisis with a degree of confidence. Nevertheless, the stakes today are higher: the global order itself is in flux, marked by a resurgent China, a beleaguered but assertive Russia, and an America whose internal politics increasingly drive its external posture.
Donald Trump’s second stint in office has injected a sharp element of discomfort. Unlike his earlier tenure, when he castigated Pakistan for duplicity and hailed India as central to the Indo-Pacific vision, his new rhetoric leans heavily in the opposite direction. His outreach to Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and his disparagement of India’s diplomatic stances have created a climate of unease. For New Delhi, this shift is unwelcome but not entirely surprising. Trump’s style has always been transactional, and his penchant for disruptive gestures makes him a difficult partner to manage. Yet it would be a mistake to overreact to his flirtation with Islamabad. Pakistan’s external equations—whether with China, the US, or the Gulf—have never fundamentally determined India’s trajectory. India’s rise rests on managing the major power triangle of Washington, Moscow and Beijing, while keeping its economy insulated from shocks.
One possible course of action is continuity. India could simply hold the line, treat the present downturn as temporary turbulence, and sustain functional cooperation with Washington until the political climate improves. This would reflect India’s tradition of strategic patience and autonomy. Such an approach would mean accepting some reduction in visibility within the US strategic calculus, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. But the advantages are tangible: safeguarding the Russia partnership, which continues to matter for defence supplies, discounted energy flows, and critical diplomatic support. Moscow, battered by sanctions and increasingly dependent on China, still values loyalty and continuity from New Delhi. By avoiding any dramatic shifts, India would also preserve its wider networks with Europe, Japan, ASEAN, and the Global South. In many ways, this option echoes the core of India’s non-aligned heritage: avoiding entanglement and waiting for the storm to pass.
The second path is correction. India could move more decisively into Washington’s camp, bend to Trump’s pressures, and seek to reinvigorate the India–US strategic partnership. Doing so would reaffirm India’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific, secure its access to critical technology and investments, and reassure Western markets that see India as a major growth engine. The lure of American capital and innovation is undeniable, especially for a country aiming to sustain high growth rates. Yet this option carries significant risks. The foremost casualty would be Russia. Alienating Moscow at a time when it leans ever closer to Beijing could leave India exposed in unforeseen ways. If Washington and Moscow were to cut a transactional deal in the future, New Delhi could find itself distrusted in Moscow, taken for granted in Washington, and deprived of strategic autonomy. Such a scenario would constrict India’s manoeuvring space—the very opposite of what its foreign policy has long sought to preserve.
The third option is opportunity. India could use the ongoing visit of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi as an opening to cautiously test a reset with Beijing. This idea may appear counter-intuitive given the Himalayan standoffs and mutual suspicion that have defined ties in recent years. Yet hard realities argue in favour of exploring this path. India’s growth trajectory depends significantly on access to Chinese supply chains and intermediate goods. For China, the security of sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean is an overriding concern. Beijing views New Delhi as a potential disruptor allied with anti-China coalitions, and this perception has fuelled its assertive behaviour along the Line of Actual Control. If India were to take modest initiatives—economic dialogues, maritime security conversations, or climate cooperation—the long-term payoff could be significant. Even limited confidence-building would reduce the chances of conflict and signal to both Washington and Moscow that India retains genuine alternatives.
Of course, the risks of disappointment with Beijing are real. China has in the past pocketed goodwill without altering its fundamental approach, and there is no guarantee it would not do so again. Domestic scepticism within India about reaching out to China remains strong, especially after repeated border confrontations. But diplomacy often requires testing uncomfortable possibilities. The example of 1962, when India and China fought a brutal war, followed by the 2000s, when China became India’s largest trading partner, is instructive: history is never static.
None of these three paths—continuity, correction, or opportunity—comes without costs. Pretending that nothing is wrong with Washington risks inertia. Kowtowing to Trump risks alienating Moscow. Reaching out to Beijing risks domestic political backlash and strategic vulnerability. Yet foreign policy has never been about single-track choices. India’s best bet may lie in a creative blend: preserve operational cooperation with the US while awaiting a friendlier era; reassure President Vladimir Putin that Russia remains valued despite sanctions; and cautiously probe the potential for reduced mistrust with China.
What is non-negotiable, however, is economic growth. India cannot afford a foreign policy that endangers its development. Access to Western markets and investment, discounted Russian oil and defence supplies, and stable Chinese supply chains all matter simultaneously. A successful foreign policy must be judged not merely by its strategic posturing but by whether it secures the resources required for India’s economic ascent. To this end, New Delhi must separate signal from noise. Trump’s embrace of Pakistan is little more than political theatre. India has weathered such swings before. During the Cold War, Washington repeatedly courted Islamabad to counterbalance China or the Soviet Union. Yet India never defined its trajectory by these oscillations. The same discipline is required today.
Indeed, the larger historical canvas is reassuring. The United States that sanctioned India in 1998 became its strategic partner by 2005. The China that inflicted defeat in 1962 became an indispensable trading partner four decades later. The Russia that today leans heavily on Beijing continues to treat India as a valued interlocutor. Nothing in global politics is permanent. The breakdown in India–US relations under Trump is real, but it is not fatal. With steadiness and balance, India can endure this phase and emerge with more—not fewer—options once the winds of geopolitics shift.
This calls for an agile, multi-aligned approach that has long been India’s strength. Patience with Washington, loyalty with Moscow, and initiative with Beijing—these three strands woven together can preserve strategic space and protect core interests. For Washington, India must continue to signal that it remains a crucial partner in the Indo-Pacific, even if political rhetoric is unhelpful. For Moscow, India must demonstrate continuity in defence and energy cooperation, providing Russia with one of its few enduring partnerships beyond China. For Beijing, India must cautiously keep the door ajar, signalling that mistrust need not foreclose every avenue of cooperation.
The wider international environment also matters. Europe, grappling with its own strategic uncertainty, increasingly sees India as a balancing force. Japan and ASEAN, worried about China’s assertiveness, continue to strengthen ties with New Delhi. The Global South, looking for leadership beyond traditional Western dominance, often finds resonance in India’s positions. These constituencies expand India’s options and mitigate overdependence on any single power centre.
At its core, then, the challenge for India is not to choose one camp but to sustain room for manoeuvre. Multi-alignment, which some critics dismissed as hedging, is in fact a sophisticated strategy of resilience. It acknowledges that global politics is too fluid, and India’s interests too wide-ranging, to be subsumed into a single axis. The ability to engage Washington, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously—even amid turbulence—remains India’s greatest asset.
The present storm in India–US relations under Donald Trump is, therefore, less a crisis than a test. It is a test of whether India can remain steady, resist the temptation of reactive decisions, and chart a course that secures its economy while preserving its autonomy. History suggests that it can. The 1998 sanctions became the 2005 breakthrough. The current downturn too will pass. What matters is that India emerges from it not diminished but strengthened, with a wider set of partnerships and an unshaken trajectory of growth.
Foreign policy is about steering through turbulence, not eliminating it. For India, the task today is precisely that: to endure the storm with resilience, to protect its economy with prudence, and to prepare for calmer waters where its options multiply. The choices ahead are hard, but India has always thrived on hard choices. This moment will be no different.
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)
