By Dipak Kurmi
On the sidelines of the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defence Ministers’ Conclave, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh made a pointed remark: “India and China should work towards resolving the complex issues under a structured roadmap and should de-escalate tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).” His words were met with guarded affirmation from the Chinese side, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning acknowledging that “the border dispute is complicated and takes time to resolve.” She reiterated Beijing’s readiness to engage in talks on delimitation and cited the existing Special Representative (SR) mechanism and the previously signed Agreement on the “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the China-India Boundary Question” as positive precedents.
Yet, this mutual recognition of complexity masks a more deep-rooted and historically convoluted dispute—one that remains unresolved despite over two decades of SR-level dialogues and 23 rounds of talks. This calls into question the true nature of the so-called complexity. Is the border dispute merely a matter of cartographic disagreement, or is it symptomatic of deeper strategic, political, and ideological rifts?
Historical Roots of the Conflict
India was among the first non-communist nations to recognize the People’s Republic of China and supported its inclusion into the United Nations during the early years of the Cold War. However, this early camaraderie gave way to suspicion and eventual hostility. The fulcrum of this shift was the territorial question, particularly Beijing’s position on Tibet and the borders surrounding it. In 1954, India and China signed the Panchsheel Agreement, which was meant to govern relations and foster peaceful coexistence. However, the very next year, India published maps showing Aksai Chin—then virtually unadministered but traditionally considered Indian territory—as part of Ladakh. This clashed with China’s own claims, especially as the region was essential for a highway linking Tibet and Xinjiang.
The situation was exacerbated by the growing unrest in Tibet, the Dalai Lama’s dramatic escape to India in 1959, and a rising influx of Tibetan refugees. In 1958, China retaliated with its own maps showing large swathes of Indian territory as Chinese. The effort at compromise came in 1960 when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai proposed that India relinquish its claim over Aksai Chin in return for China dropping its claim over Arunachal Pradesh. India’s refusal set the stage for the 1962 Sino-Indian War, a brief but humiliating conflict that reshaped the strategic imagination of both nations.
Although the border remained undefined, from 1967 to 1975 relative peace prevailed, thanks to Beijing’s willingness to delink the border dispute from broader bilateral relations. This period of detente proved short-lived. China soon reasserted its claims over Arunachal Pradesh, especially the Tawang region, citing its religious significance for Tibetan Buddhists. This strategic ambiguity and inconsistent diplomatic posture continue to fuel distrust in New Delhi.
Diplomatic Initiatives and Their Discontents
A major turning point came in 1993 with Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s visit to Beijing, where both sides agreed to maintain the status quo along the LAC and work toward a political solution. The understanding was that both countries would clarify positions on the LAC through mutual exchange of maps. However, this mutual understanding began to deteriorate when China began questioning India’s sovereignty over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) during the early 2000s.
The effort was revitalized during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s tenure with the appointment of Special Representatives to manage the boundary negotiations. This move was institutionalized by his successor Dr. Manmohan Singh during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s 2005 visit. Both nations agreed on protocols for troop behavior and committed to regular high-level dialogues. But China’s transgressions kept rising. By 2007, Beijing had intensified patrolling and began objecting to Indian projects in Arunachal Pradesh, while ambiguously referring to it as “Southern Tibet.”
In 2013, Chinese troops intruded into the Depsang Plains in Ladakh, erecting a camp 19 kilometers inside Indian territory. The standoff was diffused diplomatically, resulting in the signing of a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement. However, the episode reinforced the perception that China was increasingly willing to use military pressure to redefine realities on the ground.
The Modi-Xi Years: Engagement and Escalation
Since 2014, under the Modi administration, India has significantly enhanced border infrastructure, enabling faster troop deployment and better surveillance. This development appears to have irked Beijing, which perceived it as a challenge to the asymmetric control it had enjoyed in remote frontier areas. Although the Modi-Xi bonhomie during bilateral summits—such as the Wuhan and Mamallapuram informal meetings—projected an image of diplomatic pragmatism, reality along the LAC told a different story.
In 2017, the Doklam standoff highlighted a new era of confrontation, where Indian forces confronted the Chinese military in a third country—Bhutan. The following years saw a sharp rise in Chinese incursions: over 663 transgressions and 108 aerial violations in 2019 alone. Matters took a decisive and violent turn in May 2020 when over 5,000 Chinese troops advanced into several points along the LAC—Galwan Valley, Gogra Hot Springs, and Pangong Tso. The Indian Defence Ministry officially recorded increased Chinese aggression from 5 May 2020 onwards, marking a significant departure from prior standoffs. The deadly clash at Galwan, which claimed lives on both sides, was the first fatal border incident in 45 years and shattered the fragile trust that existed.
The Geopolitical Undercurrents
The border conflict cannot be understood in isolation from broader geopolitical currents. After the 2008 global financial crisis, China rapidly ascended as an economic powerhouse. Its growing confidence found expression in more assertive foreign policy moves, especially in its peripheries. Concurrently, India began expanding its strategic engagements with the United States, deepened defence partnerships under the Quad framework, and advocated for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Beijing viewed these developments with suspicion, interpreting them as containment strategies orchestrated by the West with India’s cooperation.
Post-2020, China’s domestic narrative—reeling from COVID-19 fallout and rising global criticism—sought to redirect attention toward external adversaries. In this context, military posturing along the India-China border served both strategic and symbolic purposes: to showcase strength, assert sovereignty, and test the resolve of regional actors.
Beijing’s long-standing alliance with Pakistan further complicates matters. Its opposition to Indian sovereignty over PoK, deep involvement in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and use of Pakistan as a strategic lever to contain India, foster deep-seated mistrust. For New Delhi, any proposed buffer zones or de-escalation measures are viewed through the prism of this triangular hostility.
A Structured Framework for Resolution: The 4 D’s
In light of the persistent volatility, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh proposed a four-point roadmap at the SCO Defence Ministers’ Meet—referred to as the “4 D’s”: (1) adherence to the 2024 disengagement agreement, (2) continued de-escalation to prevent border flare-ups, (3) fast-tracking the demarcation process, and (4) beginning concrete talks on delimitation.
Central to the success of this framework is the urgent need to establish a shared understanding of the LAC, especially since mutual perceptions have diverged dramatically since 2002. While the middle sector of the LAC (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) sees relatively fewer disputes, the western (Ladakh) and eastern (Arunachal Pradesh) sectors remain flashpoints. Here, the absence of demarcation has led to frequent friction, sometimes spiraling into full-blown crises.
Creating and maintaining demilitarized buffer zones in contested zones may provide short-term stability. However, any sustainable peace must be built on mutual recognition of sovereignty, restraint in strategic alliances, and an end to unilateral cartographic aggression.
Towards Strategic Maturity
Despite their differences, India and China remain two of the most consequential actors in the Global South. Both advocate for a multipolar world, reform in global institutions, and greater representation for developing nations. In this context, prolonging a border dispute with a fellow Asian power risks undermining China’s credibility as a responsible regional actor. For Beijing, it is imperative to reassess the long-term cost of militarized standoffs with a rising India—one that is confident, assertive, and committed to playing a greater role in global governance.
India, on its part, is unlikely to concede to aggressive posturing, having already absorbed the costs of conflict and recalibrated its military strategy. The future of the bilateral relationship may well rest on whether China views negotiations as a genuine path to resolution or merely a tactical pause in a longer game of territorial revisionism.
In the final analysis, the India-China border issue is not only about lines on a map—it is about national narratives, strategic anxieties, and competing visions of order in Asia. If this historical puzzle is to be resolved, it will require not only maps and mechanisms, but also mutual political will, historical honesty, and the courage to reimagine coexistence.
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)
